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Author(s): Ervand Abrahamian

Source: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1970), pp. 291-316

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/162649>

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*Ervand Abrahamian*

## COMMUNISM AND COMMUNALISM IN IRAN: THE *TUDAH* AND THE *FIRQAH-I DIMUKRAT*

Iran has experienced the rare phenomenon of having two pro-Soviet Communist parties simultaneously: the *Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran* (Party of the Iranian Masses), known as the *Tudah*; and the *Firqah-i Dimokrat-i Azarbayjan* (Democratic Party of Azarbayjan), or simply, the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*.

The *Tudah* Party was formed by a circle of young Marxist intellectuals in Tehran soon after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941. Within two years it grew into a national movement with considerable following among the intelligentsia and the working class. It remained a significant force until its suppression in 1953.

The *Firqah-i Dimokrat* was created in Tabriz during the summer of 1945 by a group of veteran Communists headed by Ja'far Pishavari. It absorbed the local *Tudah* Party, expanded throughout Iranian Azarbayjan, and carried through a local coup d'état while the Soviet army prevented Iranian reinforcements from entering the province. It remained in power until Iranian troops reoccupied the region in December 1946.

The *Firqah-i Dimokrat* and the *Tudah* continued to function as two separate organizations for another fourteen years, until 1960, when the former voted to amalgamate into the latter on the grounds that 'There was no longer any justification for having two separate Marxist-Leninist parties in the same country.'<sup>1</sup>

Most observers have dismissed the simultaneous existence of these two parties as nothing more than one of Stalin's schemes contrived to expand Soviet influence in the Middle East. Gunther Nollau and Hans-Yurgen Wiehe, in their book *Russia's Southern Flank*, believe that the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* appeared and the *Tudah* Party in Azarbayjan disappeared because of Soviet 'instructions'.<sup>2</sup> Donald Wilber, in his study of modern Iran, has claimed that the *Tudah* was led, not by the intellectuals in its central committee, but by 'professional communists', such as Pishavari, who denied having any connections with the organization; and that, with the war coming to an end, the Russians 'suddenly replaced' the *Tudah* in Azarbayjan with the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* in order to give themselves a 'permanent foothold' in the country.<sup>3</sup> George Lenczowski, in his *Russia and the West*

<sup>1</sup> H. Farvardin, 'Long Live the Unity of the Iranian Working Class', *Mardum*, vol. VI (June–July 1965), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> G. Nollau and H. Wiehe, *Russia's Southern Flank* (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 28.

<sup>3</sup> D. Wilber, *Contemporary Iran* (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp. 139–40.

in Iran has written that the *Tudah* was 'a reincarnation of the old Communist Party' of the 1930s; that its views were represented by Pishavari's newspaper, *Azshir* (Alarm); and that, in September 1945, it 'assumed' a new name in Azarbayjan: 'it became known as the Democratic Party'.<sup>1</sup> And Elgin Groseclose, in his introduction to Iran written immediately after the war, credited Pishavari with being 'the head' of both the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* and the *Tudah* in Azarbayjan.<sup>2</sup>

These writers, in explaining the existence of two Communist parties in one country, have all concentrated on the international context rather than on the internal Iranian situation, whereas this article will emphasize the latter. Specifically, it will attempt to explain the situation by examining the social and political backgrounds of the leaders of the two parties, restating their conflicting aims and aspirations, and describing the communal conflicts that divided Iranian society and the Iranian Communist movement at that time.<sup>3</sup>

#### COMMUNAL CONFLICTS 1905-41

Iran is a society of minorities (see Table 1). The single largest group, the Farsi-speaking Iranians, known as the Persians, comprise only 45% of the population and are concentrated in the central provinces and the cities. The second largest group, the Turkic, constitute another 26% and are subdivided into the sedentary Azaris, the vast majority in Azarbayjan and a significant minority in the northern towns, and the tribal Turkmans, Qashqayis, Shahsavans, and Afshars, who form distinct entities in the north and in the southern province of Fars. The rest of the population is made up of smaller linguistic groups such as the Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, Armenians, and Assyrians, and of marginal linguistic minorities, such as the Gilakis, Mazandarani, Lurs, and Bakhtiyaris, who converse in various dialects of Iranian incomprehensible to the Farsi-speaker.

Much of Iranian history has been composed of struggles between these communities: tribe against tribe, sect against sect, region against region, and, as Edward Browne, the historian of Persian literature, has described, 'race against race'.<sup>4</sup> The traditional monarchs of different dynasties were able to survive these conflicts and bind together the numerous groups into single empires for extensive

<sup>1</sup> G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-49* (New York, Cornell University Press, 1949), pp. 223-5 and 287.

<sup>2</sup> E. Groseclose, *Introduction to Iran* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 233.

<sup>3</sup> In this article the word 'class' is applied to describe the horizontal layers in society formed of individuals tied together by common relations to the modes of production and administration. The term 'communal' is used to characterize the vertical columns in society created by linguistic, religious, regional, racial, and tribal bonds. For a detailed discussion of this theme see J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York, Praeger, 1969).

<sup>4</sup> E. G. Browne, *A Year Amongst the Persians* (London, Adam and Charles Black, 1959), pp. 109-10: 'The whole history of Persia, from the legendary wars between the Kiyani kings and Afrasiyab down to the present day, is the story of a struggle between the Turkish races. . . and the Persians. The distinction is well marked even now and the old antipathy still exists.'

periods of time only by accepting communal diversity and tolerating unorthodox creeds so long as all believed in their divine right to rule. The rulers of Iran endured regional autonomy so long as all recognized their royal legitimacy. They treated the tribes and many of the religious communities as self-governing entities so long as all paid their taxes. And, above all, they viewed linguistic heterogeneity as a permanent fact of life imposed on man by God.

TABLE I. *Linguistic breakdown of Iran*  
(percentage of the total population)

Linguistic minorities (%)	Farsis	45 %	Marginal linguistic minorities (%)
Turkic			
Azaris	19		Mazandarani and Gilakis 8
Qashqayis, Turkmans, Shahsavans, and Afshars	7		
Kurds	7		Bakhtiyaris and Lurs 6
Arabs	3		
Baluchis	2		
Armenians and Assyrians	1		
Others	2		

SOURCES: There are no accurate statistics on the linguistic breakdown of the Iranian population. These estimates have been obtained from the following sources: American University, *The U.S. Army Area Handbook for Iran* (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1963); S. Aliyev, 'The Problem of Nationalities in Contemporary Iran', the English summary of the Russian text is in *The Central Asian Review*, vol. xvi (1966), pp. 62-70; S. I. Bruk, 'The Ethnic Composition of Iran', the English summary of the Russian text is in *The Central Asian Review*, vol. viii (1960), pp. 417-20.

Increasing contact with the homogeneous societies of Western Europe gradually undermined this traditional arrangement of government and society. The modernizing intellectuals, even those originating from the non-Farsi minorities, associated linguistic diversity with oriental inefficiency, regional autonomy with administrative anarchy, and tribal nomadism with rural gangsterism. They planned to transform their multi-tribal, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural empire into a unified state with one central authority, one language, one culture, and one nationality. To achieve this goal they advocated two methods: centralization of the administration and Persianization of the linguistic minorities. *Habl al-Matin* (The Firm Clarion), a prominent reformist newspaper in the early twentieth century, drew attention to the linguistic problem in an editorial directed to the Ministry of Education:<sup>1</sup>

A society can modernize itself only when it constitutes a nation. And it constitutes a nation only when it is bound together by common traditions, beliefs, and characteristics. Allegiance to a single monarch is not enough, as some falsely claim. When these bonds

<sup>1</sup> Editorial, 'A Problem Worthy of Interest for the Ministry of Education in Azar-bajan', *Habl al-Matin*, 12 Nov. 1906.

are missing, society is torn by disunity, and disunity, we all know from our own bitter experience, prevents modernization. . . . Many of our present misfortunes can be traced to the Mongol and Tartar invasions, when a foreign language was imposed on our beloved Azarbayjan, and our population was sharply divided into Farsi and Turkish speakers.

During the constitutional revolution of 1905 the reformers exacted from the Turkish-speaking Qajar court an electoral system that gave over one-third of the parliamentary seats to the Farsi-speaking capital and restricted entry into the the *Majlis* to those who could read and write Persian. After the revolution, the reformers, coalescing into the Democrat Party, pressed ahead for the creation of a modern bureaucracy and a state-wide educational system. These projects, however, were made unfeasible by the opposition of the conservative landed oligarchy, and the disruptions caused by the Anglo-Russian invasion of 1911, World War I, and the subsequent revolts in Gilan, *Khurasan*, and Azarbayjan.

The uprising in Gilan was led by *Kuchik Khan*, a local religious leader. Diverse elements joined his *Jangali* (Jungle) movement: Gilaki men of property struggling for provincial autonomy from the 'corrupt' central government; Azari-speaking revolutionaries from the Iranian Communist Party based in Baku; pan-Islamists waging a crusade against the British; and Democrats fighting a war of national liberation against the 'imperialists' and their collaborators in Tehran. These rebels with their many causes, having established their Soviet Socialist Republic in Gilan and watched the British evacuate Iran, pursued separate paths and therefore fell victim to the central authorities. By the end of 1921 *Kuchik Khan's* head was on display in Tehran to prove to all that the uprising was over.

In *Khurasan*, Colonel Taqi *Khan*, commander of the provincial gendarmerie, defied the Minister of Interior's plan to centralize the armed forces and created his own '*Khurasan Army*'. Some of the Democrats in *Mashhad*, despairing of obtaining reforms from the conservative Tehran establishment, joined him. However, the revolution turned into a fiasco within a few months. The regional gendarmerie was no match for the national army reinforced by loyal tribes. And the local Democrats, many of them Azari immigrants, proved to be more a liability than an asset.<sup>1</sup>

The revolt in Azarbayjan was the most serious of the three. It began in May 1917 when *Shaykh Muhammad Khiabani*, a fiery Tabriz preacher, accused the government of discriminating against the provinces in the parliamentary elections, and demanded the establishment of elected provincial councils.<sup>2</sup> It turned into a full-fledged uprising when the regional branch of the Democrat Party supported *Khiabani*, officially renamed itself the *Firqah-i Dimokrat-i Azarbayjan*, and proceeded to govern the entire province. It reached a peak when these rebels

<sup>1</sup> J. Majiri, 'The *Khurasan* Revolt and its Lessons', *Dunya*, vol. 11 (Winter, 1966), pp. 101-18.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of *Khiabani's* speeches and pamphlets see 'A. Azari, *Qiyam-i Shayikh Muhammad Khiabani* (*Shayikh Muhammad Khiabani's* Revolt) (Tehran, Bungah-i Safi 'Ali Shah, 1950).

established the autonomous government of *Azadistan* (Land of Freedom). However, they overlooked the necessity of organizing an army for defense, so their movement collapsed as soon as the central government was able to dispatch troops. Khiabani was killed in September 1920 and his supporters scattered. Some of them regrouped five months later and helped Major Lahuti, a gendarmerie officer, capture Tabriz, but they were promptly evicted by the army.

These revolts only temporarily shook the Iranian state, but shattered the Democrat Party permanently. Some party members, especially in the provincial cities, were now willing to ally with regional movements in the hope of obtaining immediate social reforms in their own localities. Others, especially in the capital, continued to believe that modernism was incompatible with regionalism. Sulayman Mirza Iskandari, Chairman of the Democrat Party in Tehran, therefore refused to support his organization in Gilan, Khurasan, and Azarbayjan. Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar, the poet laureate and a prominent Democrat in Mashhad, openly opposed Taqi Khan, Kuchik Khan, and Khiabani, insisting that 'without a strong central authority the country would degenerate into anarchy'.<sup>1</sup> And Ahmad Kasravi, the ideologue of Iranian nationalism, was expelled from his party and deported from his native Azarbayjan when he criticized Khiabani's actions, especially his protection of journalists who advocated writing in Turkish. With the defeat of the provincial revolts, the modernizers revived their former proposals. *Ayandah* (The Future), a journal popular among the intelligentsia, began publication with an editorial entitled 'National Unity is Our First Aim'.<sup>2</sup>

All who value Iranian history, the Persian language, and the Shi'ah religion must realize that they have much to lose if the Iranian state crumbles. And the Iranian state is in danger of crumbling as long as its citizens consider themselves not primarily as Iranians, but as Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Bakhtiyaris, and Turkmans. We must, therefore, eliminate minority languages, regional sentiments, and tribal allegiances, and transform the various inhabitants of present day Iran into one nation. This we can accomplish by radically expanding the elementary educational system, and thus taking the Farsi language and Iranian history to the provinces.

The editor of *Ayandah*, Mahmud Afshar, elaborated on this theme later in an article entitled 'The National Unity of Iran and the Problem of Nationality'.<sup>3</sup> He argued that since Shi'ism could no longer bind Iran into one state, and since Iran was threatened by the Turkish 'yellow danger' and the Arab 'green danger', the government needed to strengthen the cultural, economic, and geographic bonds among the diverse communities. Otherwise, Iran would disintegrate like the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He recommended the following precautions: promotion of the Farsi language and Iranian history in all parts of the country, especially in Azarbayjan, Kurdistan, Khuzistan, and Baluchistan; the building of

<sup>1</sup> Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar, *Tarikh-i Mukhtasar-yi Ahzab-i Siyas-yi Iran* (A Short History of Political Parties in Iran) (Tehran, Chap-i Rangin, 1943), p. ix.

<sup>2</sup> Editorial, 'National Unity is Our First Aim', *Ayandah*, vol. I (1925), pp. 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> M. Afshar, 'The National Unity of Iran and the Problem of Nationality', *Ayandah*, vol. II (1926), pp. 559-69.

a national railway system; the elimination of non-Persian placenames; the transportation of Turkic and Arab tribes from the borders into the central regions; and the rationalization of the central administration.

Many of these schemes were implemented by the new monarch, Riza Shah, soon after he deposed the Qajars and established his own power. He outlawed the traditional dress; appointed a committee to purge Persian of Arabic words; eliminated the provinces of Kurdistan and Arabistan; divided Azarbayjan into two provinces, with one section incorporating a large community of Kurds; began building the Trans-Iranian Railway; channeled all foreign trade through the capital; created a centralized bureaucracy; closed all the non-Farsi publishing houses; and, most important of all, destroyed minority language schools, building in their place a state educational system with Farsi as the only official language of instruction.

These programs, while popular among the reformers, were generally unpopular among the conservatives. For the national intelligentsia, Persianization was an integral part of modernization, but for the non-Farsi intellectuals, who had not benefited from the state educational system, it was tantamount to ethnic discrimination. For the modern middle class, centralization was indispensable for progress, but for the traditional middle class in the provinces it was the root cause of their regional backwardness. For patriotic theorists such as Kasravi and Afshar, national consciousness was a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a modern state, but for the communal leaders it was an unnecessary evil undermining communal consciousness. Thus, modernization, instead of alleviating and finally eliminating the traditional communal conflicts aggravated and sharply intensified them.

The Allied invasion in 1941 and the subsequent destruction of Riza Shah's regime revealed the intensity of these conflicts. In the *Majlis*, deputies vehemently denounced the government for exploiting the countryside for the sake of the capital and acting as if 'Iran was only Tehran'. In the provinces, especially in Azarbayjan, discontented groups threatened to gain redress for their grievances.

A number of factors made Azarbayjan particularly volatile: Riza Shah's neglect of the area in contrast to his encouragement of industry in Tehran, Isfahan, Mazandaran, and Gilan; his discouragement of commerce with the Soviet Union, the natural trading partner of Azarbayjan; the existence of a strong national consciousness among the Azari community, while many of the other minorities, such as the Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmans, lived in a world limited by tribal horizons; the presence of a Turkish-speaking intelligentsia, trained in Baku and Istanbul before the expansion of the Iranian educational system; the discontent of the *Muhajirin* (Immigrants), a group of Iranian citizens who had returned home from the Soviet Union three years earlier but failed to find employment and adapt themselves to their new environment; Soviet promotion of Azari literature in neighbouring Communist Azarbayjan; and the propaganda activities of the Soviet troops, many of whom were Turkish-speaking.

A member of the American Legation in Tehran, sent to observe the situation in Azarbayjan, reported to Washington that in the wake of the Russian invasion the law enforcement forces had disintegrated and all high officials had fled to Tehran.<sup>1</sup> Their place had been taken by armed volunteers, recruited mostly from the *Muhajirin* by a Commission of Notables who had refused to recognize the authority of the central government. He further reported that an 'indigenous movement' for creating an autonomous Azarbayjan within the Iranian state probably had 'widespread' sympathy.

Soviet restraint, however, prevented these sentiments from firing a full scale uprising in 1941. For the time being, Moscow withheld its support from the regional movement, withdrew recognition of the Commission of Notables, and instead, assisted the new governor sent from Tehran. But these sentiments remained ready to burst into a provincial revolt at the opportune moment.<sup>2</sup>

#### THE TUDAH AND THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM 1941-5

The history of the *Tudah* Party begins with Dr Taqi Arani. Born into an Azari-speaking middle class family in Tabriz at the turn of the century, he completed one of the few secular schools in the city and left for Tehran. A medical student in the capital at the height of the anti-British agitation after the first world war, he was inevitably drawn into the nationalist movement. A recent communist biographer has written: 'Arani, like many of his fellow students, was strongly influenced by extreme nationalism.'<sup>3</sup> While advocating rapid modernization, he favored the elimination of foreign words from Persian, the revival of Zoroastrian ideals, and the creation of a centralized state, claiming that the Sasanian Empire had such an administration.

Arani graduated from college in 1922, and went to study chemistry in Berlin. Living in the ideologically torn Germany of the Weimar Republic, he was exposed to socialist theory, a facet of Europe almost unknown in Tehran and Tabriz. He immersed himself in the works of socialist writers, took an active interest in the German left-wing, and through it in the exiled Communist Party of Iran. While studying for his doctorate, he taught Arabic at the university, wrote three short books on Persian culture—on Omar *Khayyam*, Sa'di, and Nasir *Khusraw*—and attracted around him a circle of fellow students from Iran interested in socialism. The European left-wing, however, failed to alter his nationalistic views of the linguistic issue in Iran. In an article entitled 'Azarbayjan: A Vital and a Deadly Problem for Iran', published in an intellectual journal in Berlin,

<sup>1</sup> J. Moose, Jr., 'Memorandum on Azerbaijan' (unpublished despatch in the files of the State Department, sent on 10 November 1941), pp. 1-22.

<sup>2</sup> In 1943 a State Department memorandum, commenting on the popularity of the Russians, stated: 'One of our reports had even gone so far as to say that a Soviet could be set up in Azerbaijan overnight, if the Russians gave the word.' U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.; GPO, 1964), 1943, vol. IV, p. 329.

<sup>3</sup> Anonymous, 'Dr Taqi Arani', *Mardum*, 30 June 1960.

he advocated the elimination of Turkish from his home province, claiming that the people of Azarbayjan were anxious to relearn Iranian which they had forgotten as a result of the Mongol invasions: 'All well-wishing Iranians, especially the Ministry of Education, must do all they can to replace Turkish with Persian. They must send to Azarbayjan Persian school-teachers, Persian books, Persian journals, and Persian newspapers.'

Arani returned home in 1930 a convinced Marxist determined to introduce and popularize Marxism in Iran. Since this ambition was soon made impossible by a 1931 law banning the propagation of *ishtirakiyya* (socialism-communism), he and some of his colleagues from Germany organized secret discussion groups where they read and translated socialist classics and prepared articles on the class struggle, historical materialism, and the social sciences for their underground journal, *Dunya* (The World). There is no evidence that they ever read Lenin's *Right of Nations to Self-Determination*.

In 1937, after a student strike at the Tehran Technical College, the police uncovered the organization and arrested Arani with fifty-two of his associates. Although some of them were soon released, the group remained famous as 'the fifty-three'. After sixteen months of intensive investigations, forty-eight of them were brought to trial. Most of them were members of the Persian and the Persianized intelligentsia living in the capital.<sup>1</sup> Forty-two were residents of Tehran, three of Mazandaran, two of Abadan, and one of Isfahan. All but one—a Bahayi—were from Muslim homes. Linguistically, thirty-three were born in Farsi-speaking regions, but many of the others, like Arani, had been assimilated into Persian culture through the state educational system. Twenty-six had attended higher institutions of learning, six of them West European universities. Professionally, the group comprised two professors, four physicians, three lawyers, one engineer, three high school principals, four high school teachers, eleven civil servants, eleven students, eight workers, and one peasant. The average age of the intellectuals among them was only thirty-seven.

All were prosecuted under the law banning socialism and communism, and they were arraigned for being members of a communistic organization. Most were further indicated for propagating an ideology that was 'communistic', 'socialistic', 'materialistic', and even 'atheistic'. And a few were also accused of communicating with Communists in exile, organizing a student strike in Tehran, and conspiring to disrupt textile factories in Isfahan. Some of the defendants admitted an interest in Marxism, many confessed to being Socialists, but all denied being Communists. Arani, as a part of his defense, argued that socialism and communism could not be banned as they were a part of Western civilization, and Iran, by force of necessity, had to Westernize itself.<sup>2</sup> The communal issue was never raised.

<sup>1</sup> Biographical information concerning 'the fifty-three' has been obtained mostly from the proceedings of the trials published in *Ittila'at*, 2–17 Nov. 1938.

<sup>2</sup> *Tudah Party*, 'Text of Dr Arani's Defense at the Trial', *Dunya*, vol. II (Spring and Summer, 1963), pp. 108–20.

The trial ended with the conviction of forty-five of the prisoners. Arani and the leading activists received the maximum of ten years, imprisonment. The others were given terms varying from three to seven years. In prison near Tehran, they came in contact with a variety of other political prisoners: Communist survivors of the *Jangali* revolt; Communist veterans of the early trade union movement in Tehran, many of them Azaris from Gilan; army officers accused of being Fascists; tribal leaders sentenced for rebelling against the government; and a few well-known politicians sentenced for opposing the Shah.

Arani died in prison sixteen months after the trial. His colleagues charged that the wardens were responsible for his death by refusing him adequate medical treatment, while the authorities claimed that he had died from an incurable attack of typhus. Whatever the truth, the group had lost a precious leader. At the same time, however, it gained a valuable martyr. The others were still in prison when the Allied armies reached Tehran.

On 18 September 1941, only two days after Riza Shah's abdication, twenty-seven of 'the fifty-three', the ones considered more intellectual and therefore less dangerous than the rest, were released. Those who had retained their political convictions decided to form a party with the ambitious title of 'The Masses'. The leading personalities in this decision were Arani's colleagues from Europe: Dr Murtiza Yazdi, a surgeon from a clerical family prominent in Yazd during the constitutional revolution; Iraj Iskandari, nephew of Sulayman Iskandari and a member of the aristocratic Qajar family, but also an intellectual lawyer born and raised in Tehran; Dr Riza Radmanish, a native of Gilan and Professor of Physics at Tehran University before his arrest; and Buzurg 'Alavi, now considered one of the leading writers of Persian prose. They were helped by the prestigious name of Sulayman Iskandari who accepted the chairmanship of the party; by the organizational skills of the labor leaders who started forming unions as soon as they were released; and by the other members of 'the fifty-three' once they regained their freedom under the general amnesty decreed in October 1941.

Within a year, the *Tudah* Party in Tehran had grown enough to call its first provincial conference. One hundred and twenty delegates, each representing ten members in the capital and vicinity, drew up a program for the party and elected fifteen candidates to its provincial central committee. This leadership was given the authority to act as the official central committee of the whole national organization until the convening of the first party congress.<sup>1</sup>

Of the fifteen elected to the provincial central committee, six were from 'the fifty-three'; two were young intellectuals with no political pasts, recruited into the party by Arani's disciples; one—Nur al-Din Alamutti—was a high court

<sup>1</sup> The fifteen elected to the provincial central committee were; Dr M. Bahrami, Dr M. Yazdi, Dr R. Radmanish, I. Iskandari, N. Alamutti, A. Nushin, 'A. Kubari, N. 'Azazi, I. Muhazari, R. Rusta, Dr F. Kishavarz, A. Avaniassian, S. Iskandari, 'A. Amir-Khizi, and Z. Alamutti. Bibliographical information concerning the leadership of the *Tudah* has been obtained from the trials of 'the fifty-three', newspaper articles, journals, and interviews.

judge in Tehran and a member of the old Democrat Party who had been arrested and imprisoned with 'the fifty-three' but had been tried separately. Four were from the Communist Party and had been active in the early labor movement in Tehran, but had not taken part either in the creation of the party in Baku or in its guerilla campaign in Gilan. One—'Ali Amir-Khizi—had been prominent in the Khiabani revolt, but had come to Tehran after its failure and had worked closely with Sulayman Iskandari and the union leaders. The remaining member was the party chairman, Sulayman Iskandari. All were residents of Tehran at the time of their election. Ten spoke mainly Farsi at home, one was an Armenian, and four were Azaris, three of whom were from Gilan and Tehran. Professionally, the group was formed of three doctors, three clerks, three workers and worker organizers, a senior civil servant, a judge, a lawyer, a professor, a writer, and a former factory manager.

They acted as the official leadership of the national organization until the summer of 1944, when the first party congress was convened; it elected a new central committee and commissions for investigation, organization, propaganda, and finance.<sup>1</sup> Of the thirty-one candidates elected to these boards, thirteen were from the earlier provincial central committee. The other eighteen consisted of seven members of 'the fifty-three', ten young intellectuals recruited by Arani's group, and a worker from the early unions in Tehran. Fourteen were residents of the capital, while the other four were from Isfahan, Mashhad, Rasht, and east Mazandaran. Thirteen were Farsi-speakers. Of the five who were not, four had been born into Azari homes, but were now members of the Persianized intelligentsia. Professionally, they consisted of four professors, four engineers, three writers and journalists, two high school principals, two high school teachers, a lawyer, a clerk, and a carpenter.

The congress also elected three co-chairmen to replace Sulayman Iskandari, who had died five months after the provincial conference. The triumvirate consisted of Nur al-Din Alamutti, Iraj Iskandari, and Dr Muhammad Bahrami, a Farsi-speaking colleague of Arani from Germany who was still in prison when the *Tudah* was formed, but joined the leadership as soon as he was released.

The *Tudah* Party was, therefore, formed and led predominantly by Marxist members of the Persian and the Persianized intelligentsia residing in Tehran. Their social background and training was, not unexpectedly, reflected in their sentiments and policies. Living in Tehran, they tended to underestimate the

<sup>1</sup> The members of the central committee were: N. Alamutti, Dr M. Bahrami, P. Gunabadi, A. Avaniassian, E. Tabari, I. Iskandari, A. Amir-Khizi, Dr R. Radmanish, M. Buqrati, 'A. Kambakhsh, and Dr F. Kishavarz. Investigation committee: Dr M. Yazdi, Dr H. Jawdat, 'A. Nushin, Khalil Maliki, A. 'Alavi, R. Rusta, A. Qassimi, Dr N. Kianuri, and Z. Alamutti. Organization committee: 'A. Kambakhsh, T. Fidakar, T. Makinizhad, 'A. Kubari, N. 'Azazi, Z. Alamutti, and M. Farjami. Propaganda committee: P. Gunabadi, A. Khamah, Dr Gh. Furutan, Dr S. 'Aqili, S. Muhammadzadah, H. Khir-Khah, and H. Jahani. Finance committee: Dr M. Yazdi, 'A. Amir-Khizi, and R. Rusta.

regional conflicts between the capital and the provinces. Westernizers, they associated centralization with modernization. Persian intellectuals, they advocated the rapid expansion of the state educational system. Orthodox Marxists, they viewed society through a class perspective, scorning the communal dimension. Consequently, linguistic and regional issues were ignored in all three major policy statements formulated by the party in its formative years. The first manifesto, published in January 1942, spoke in general terms of the political grievances of all Iranians against Riza Shah's autocracy.<sup>1</sup> And both the party program adopted at the first provincial conference in October 1942<sup>2</sup> and the declaration presented by the party's parliamentary deputies in February 1943<sup>3</sup> appealed directly to five social categories: the proletariat, white collar workers, tradesmen, peasants, and women.

The *Tudah* press in Tehran faithfully observed this policy of not making appeals to linguistic and regional grievances. In the winter of 1943, *Mardum* (The People), a pro-*Tudah* daily, began a campaign on the theme 'Iran is not just the residential areas of Tehran', but these articles soon ceased. The party publications were concerned, not with communal conflicts, but with the class struggle. As *Rahbar* (The Guide), the central organ of the party, stated: 'Our aim is to unite all the classes against the oligarchy.'<sup>4</sup>

This class approach succeeded in attracting the national intelligentsia and the working class of the diverse linguistic groups. By the first congress in mid-1944, the party had a membership of over 25,000, with visible branches in the northern cities and clandestine cells in the southern areas occupied by the British. And by mid-1946 the pro-*Tudah* labor movement, the Central Council of United Trade Unions (C.C.U.T.U.), claimed an enrollment of 355,000. As a writer for the International Labor Office in Geneva has described: 'Trade unionism may be said to owe its existence to the *Tudah*.'<sup>5</sup> Its unions had established roots wherever there was a salaried middle class and an industrial working class: in the factories and offices of Tehran, in the textile mills of Isfahan, Shiraz, and Yazd, in the oilfields of Khuzistan, in the plants and coalfields of Mazandaran and Gilan, and in other urban centers with concentration of light industry such as Tabriz and Mashhad.

This rapid success in mobilizing diverse groups into one organization did not herald the victory of class consciousness over communal consciousness. It merely brought communal antagonisms into the ranks of the C.C.U.T.U. and the *Tudah* Party, forcing them to take notice of the problem.

The C.C.U.T.U. began to suffer from communal conflicts as it recruited workers of different linguistic groups employed in the same factories. A union of silk weavers in Mazandaran warned that the management was scheming to

<sup>1</sup> 'A. Kamabakhsh, 'The Formation of the *Tudah* Party of Iran', *Dunya*, vol. 11 (Autumn 1966), pp. 24-36.    <sup>2</sup> *Tudah* Party, 'Party Program', *Rahbar*, 12 Feb. 1943.

<sup>3</sup> *Tudah* Party, 'Declaration of the Parliamentary Delegation', *Rahbar*, 27 Feb. 1944.

<sup>4</sup> *Rahbar*, 17 May 1944.

<sup>5</sup> M. Djamalzadeh, 'The Social and Economic Structure of Iran', *International Labour Review*, vol. 63 (February, 1951), p. 181.

destroy the organization by manipulating the Farsi workers against the Azaris.<sup>1</sup> The union in the tobacco plant in Tehran declared that right-wing parties were planning to take advantage of friction between the Farsi and Azari employees.<sup>2</sup> One of the junior intellectuals from 'the fifty-three', who was now active in the labor movement, cautioned in an article entitled 'Workers' Organizations and Their Enemies':<sup>3</sup>

The opponents of the labor movement are trying to deceive the workers by telling them there is no such thing as working class solidarity. They are hoping to destroy the movement by inciting Farsis against Azaris, and workers from one region against those from another. . . . But in a class society as we now have, everything, including political organizations, has class bases.

In the coalfields of *Shamshak* in Gilan and in the oilfields of *Khuzistan* these antagonisms eventually led to bloodshed. In *Shamshak*, in the winter of 1945, the Farsi miners physically expelled the Azari workers, killing one and wounding twenty. The survivors wrote to an Azari language newspaper published in Tabriz: 'Do you know why they evicted us? Because we are Azarbayjanis. Do you know what they call us? They describe us as Turks. Are we or are we not Iranians? Do we or do we not have any rights in Iran? Is the law impartial between the different groups or is it weighed against us?'<sup>4</sup> In the oil industry the fighting was more bloody. The Arab workers, who formed only a small minority of the total labor force, broke with the local pro-*Tudah* organizations composed of *Qash-qayis*, *Bakhtiyaris*, and *Lurs*, and enrolled in the Arab Union financed by pro-British tribal *khans*. In the summer of 1946, when the C.C.U.T.U. called for a general strike against the British-owned oil company, the Arab workers refused to stop work. This triggered off ancient antagonisms between the Sunni Arabs and the local Shi'ites, between the nomadic Arabs and the settled population. In Abadan, a crowd of 20,000 workers assaulted the armed Arab Union building and looted stores owned by Arab merchants. In the oil wells of Aqa Jari armed Arab tribesmen besieged the strikers. The *Tudah* press claimed that a total of forty-seven were killed and over one hundred and fifty wounded.<sup>5</sup>

The communal problem reared its head within the *Tudah* Party as the organization expanded from Tehran into the provincial towns. Trouble began with the outer branches criticizing the center for not taking enough interest in the provinces. It accelerated with the raising of the linguistic issue. It reached a crisis with the defection of the *Tudah* branch in Azarbayjan from the national organization to the newly formed *Firqah-i Dimokrat*.

In the first provincial conference, in October 1942, some of the delegates admitted that there was friction between the central committee and the regional

<sup>1</sup> Union of Silk Weavers in Mazandaran, 'A Declaration', *Rahbar*, 27 June 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Union of Tobacco Workers in Tehran, 'A Declaration', *Zafar*, 11 Apr. 1946.

<sup>3</sup> 'A. Hakmi, 'Workers' Organizations and Their Enemies', *Rahbar*, 25 May 1944.

<sup>4</sup> *Azarbayjan*, 27 Nov. 1945.

<sup>5</sup> *Rahbar*, 15-17 July 1946; and *Zafar*, 15-22 July 1946.

branches. The conference concluded by passing a resolution instructing the new leadership to establish better relations with the provinces, 'especially with the party organization in Azarbayjan'.<sup>1</sup>

The same complaints were heard with greater force in the first congress convened in August 1944.<sup>2</sup> Of the 168 delegates, 43 represented Azarbayjan, and at least 34 of the others were Azaris from northern Iran. Some of these were unable or unwilling to communicate in Farsi, so the meetings had to be conducted on a bi-lingual basis. For the first time in Iranian history, a political organization had reached below the middle classes and had discovered the stark reality that many Iranians could not speak the official language.

Throughout the congress, the communal issue was a recurring irritant. A militant who had organized Turkman peasants in east Mazandaran criticized the propaganda committee for its lack of interest in the provinces. Another militant who had been sent to Zanzan to work among Azaris declared that the leadership should have taken into account his ignorance of Azari, for the language barrier had made his mission unfeasible. The strongest criticisms came from the Azarbayjani contingent. One delegate complained that the central committee had failed to implement the resolution passed at the Tehran conference concerning relations between the center and the branches. He further complained that the leadership had ignored provincial grievances. Another delegate, speaking in Azari, claimed that the central committee had hindered his organization by being obsessed with ultra-leftism. Yet another, also speaking in Azari, stressed that party publications were all useless in his region for they were printed only in Farsi. He insisted that in future they should be translated into Azari. He concluded with the advice that 'the party should spend less time on talk and more time on action'. This was to become the slogan of the rebels in Azarbayjan.

This pressure from the provinces had some effect on the outcome of the congress. The earlier resolution concerning the relations between the center and the branches was repeated. And the official party program adopted by the congress made a vague attempt to incorporate communal grievances.<sup>3</sup> After stressing that 'the *Tudah* Party is an organization of the toilers-workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals, and tradesmen', it demanded: 'Equal social rights for all the people of the Iranian nation (*millat*), irrespective of religion and race'; and 'Complete educational and religious freedom for the minorities'.

This program was unclear for four main reasons. By speaking of the 'Iranian nation', it implied that the people of Azarbayjan were not a 'nation'. By failing to mention what languages should be taught in the educational system, it avoided the central linguistic problem. By ignoring the whole subject of provincial councils, the chief issue in the revolts after the first world war, it shied away from the regional question. And by not defining its use of the term 'minorities', many

<sup>1</sup> *Rahbar*, 10 Feb. 1943.

<sup>2</sup> The minutes of the congress were published in *Rahbar*, 2 Aug.-7 Sept. 1944.

<sup>3</sup> *Tudah* Party, 'Party Program', *Rahbar*, 7 Sept. 1944.

observers took it to mean, not the linguistic minorities, but only the legally recognized religious minorities: the Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews.

The same vagueness was apparent in a book titled *Mas'alah-yi Millat* (The Problem of Nationalities), written by a prominent member of the party in Tehran.<sup>1</sup> The author, an Azari doctor educated in Russia, began with a clear statement expressing the urgency of the problem:

The question of nationalities and their rights is a vital issue in such states as Iran where diverse peoples live together. It is a subject which no progressive party can avoid, for it is closely related to many social and political issues: to the struggle for national independence; to the fight for the liberation of the peasantry; and to the war against the exploitation of the working class.

He underlined the urgency by reminding his readers that patriotism was a sentiment that could be used by reactionaries against the progressives: 'Class conscious workers are not tempted by bourgeois flags, but peasants are.' He then set himself the question: 'What is a Nationality?' After describing, at considerable length, the debates between West European and Russian socialists, he arrived at the conclusion that Stalin's definition was correct: 'A nationality is formed of a people who are held together by language, culture, history, territory, and economics.' From this point on the book becomes obscure. The author, instead of pursuing his line of argument and applying this definition to the various communities in Iran, injected the issue of imperialism into his discussion: 'The question of nationalities, which was formerly an internal problem, has now become an international issue closely tied to the threat of imperialism.' The concluding chapter on 'How to Solve the Problem' summarized Lenin's view of imperialism and avoided dealing with the question of nationalities in Iran. Thus, a book which had started by emphasizing the importance of the subject to Iran ended without mentioning Iran. Nowhere did the author deal with the immediate issues. Nowhere did he define which Iranian minority qualified as a 'nationality'. Nowhere did he state their national rights, and nowhere did he set down their specific grievances.

Lack of precision in policy caused confusion in the party. Some continued to favor Persianization. Others pressed for de-Persianization. Ahmad Qassimi, the delegate at the congress who had worked among Turkman peasants, gave a very liberal interpretation to the official party program in his book *Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran Chah Mi-Guyad va Chah Mi-Khahad?* (What Does the Tudah Party of Iran Say and Want?):<sup>2</sup>

States sometimes deprive their minorities of their own schools, literature, and history. This has two disastrous consequences: it destroys minority cultures preventing them from contributing to world civilization; and it alienates the minorities from the majority,

<sup>1</sup> R. Hashtrudiyān, *Mas'alah-yi Millat* (The Problem of Nationalities) (Tehran, Shirkat-i Sahami, 1945).

<sup>2</sup> A. Qassimi, *Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran Chah-Mi-Guyad va Chah Mi-Khahad?* (What Does the Tudah Party of Iran Say and Want?) (Tehran, Shirkat-i Shami Chap-i Farhang-i Iran, 1944-5), p. 31.

eventually causing a civil war, as happened between Turks and Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, a state should respect its minorities not only for the sake of culture, but also to safeguard its own existence. Iran is a multi-lingual state, and although we all have a common history, the rights of the linguistic minorities should be respected, as the Tudah Party has stated in its program. Otherwise, our enemies will take advantage of the situation to destroy our state.

These sentiments, however, were contradicted by the second provincial conference of the *Tudah* Party in Tehran.<sup>1</sup> Although some of the delegates complained that the central committee was concerned solely with the capital and treated the other branches 'in the same way as the government deals with the provinces', the majority passed a resolution instructing the party to open schools in order to teach Farsi to illiterates. For the intelligentsia, these classes would educate the uneducated. For the Azaris in Azarbayjan, they would assist in the Persianization of their masses.

The refusal of the *Tudah* leadership in Tehran to champion communal grievances forced the party organization in Azarbayjan to initiate its own independent policy. In early 1945 it began to sponsor mass demonstrations demanding the establishment of provincial councils and the teaching of Azari in local schools. Once the central committee heard of these unauthorized activities, it despatched a three-man commission to investigate the situation. The delegation was headed by Khalil Maliki, a junior member of 'the fifty-three' and a typical example of the Persianized intelligentsia. Born in Tabriz, brought up in central Iran, and educated for a short period in Germany, he spoke Farsi with a distinct Turkish accent but was a militant advocate of Persianization and centralization. He left the *Tudah* in 1947, and twenty years later, when he was brought to trial for propagating socialism, he revealed for the first time an account of his mission to Azarbayjan.<sup>2</sup> He disclosed that he was shocked to discover that many of the party militants could not speak Persian, that his refusal to use Azari when addressing public meetings antagonized them, and that his blunt criticisms of demonstrations demanding the teaching of Azari caused a major showdown with Muhammad Biriya, local chairman of the C.C.U.T.U. and an Azari poet of considerable talent. Khalil Maliki returned to Tehran determined to initiate a major purge in Azarbayjan. He relates that he received a favorable hearing before the central committee, but that they were overtaken by events before they could take any action. The uprising had begun.

<sup>1</sup> The minutes of the second provincial conference in Tehran were published in *Rahbar*, 19–22 Aug. 1945.

<sup>2</sup> Society of Iranian Socialists, 'Text of Khalil Maliki's Defense at His Trial', vol. II (Oct. 1966), pp. 36–56.

THE *FIRQAH-I DIMUKRAT*'S UPRISING, 1945-46

The Turkish-speaking revolutionaries from Azarbayjan who had formed the first Iranian communist organization in Baku—the ‘*Adalat* (Justice) Committee’—and had participated in the revolt in Gilan were conspicuous by their absence in the leadership of the *Tudah* Party. Some had been killed in the Russian civil war and in Gilan. Some had disappeared in the Stalinist purges. And a few remained in the Soviet Union throughout the 1940s. But a noticeable group of them who were active in Tehran kept aloof from the *Tudah* Party.

The most prominent of this group was Ja‘far Pishavari. Born in a village near Tabriz in 1893, he migrated to Russian Azarbayjan at the early age of twelve. After high school he became a teacher in Baku. His political experiences began immediately after the February revolution. He helped organize the ‘*Adalat* Committee and edited its Persian and Turkish newspaper. A year later he was elected the organization’s first secretary, and in 1920, when the committee changed its name to the Communist Party of Iran, he was chosen one of its three secretaries. He played a leading role in the *Jangali* movement, and was elected to the nine-man executive committee that headed the Soviet Socialist Republic in Gilan. With the defeat of the revolt he fled to Baku, and from there he made his way to Tehran, where he was arrested in 1930. He spent the next eleven years in prison, where he met ‘the fifty-three’. This acquaintance did not turn into a political friendship. A fellow prisoner has revealed that Pishavari disliked them and socialized mostly with colleagues from the Caucasus.<sup>1</sup>

Upon his release in 1941, Pishavari did not take part in the formation of the *Tudah*, but joined soon after.<sup>2</sup> His membership did not last long, for by May 1943 he was editing his own newspaper *Azhir*, which was not only independent of the party, but was, at times, critical of it.

In the second half of 1943, at a time when the *Tudah* was trying to heal the old wounds between the early radicals and reformers, *Azhir* carried a series of articles on ‘The ‘*Adalat* Committee and the Democrat Party’, written by an unnamed veteran of the communist movement in Baku.<sup>3</sup> The author, in describing the sharp conflicts between the two parties, denounced the Democrats as ‘bourgeois’, ‘right-wing’, and ‘reactionary’.

At the beginning of the parliamentary elections in the winter of 1943 *Azhir* gave only half-hearted support to the *Tudah* candidates: ‘Although these men have some faults and shortcomings, at least they are not thieves, traitors and reactionaries like some of their rivals.’<sup>4</sup> But a month later, when Pishavari

<sup>1</sup> Anonymous, ‘Storm in Azarbayjan’, *Ittila‘at-i Mahanah*, vol. iv (Nov.-Dec. 1951), p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Radmanish, at the first congress, stated that Pishavari was a former member of the party, *Rahbar*, 8 Aug. 1944.

<sup>3</sup> Anon., ‘The ‘*Adalat* Committee and the Democrat Party’, *Azhir*, 18 Aug.-2 Nov. 1943.

<sup>4</sup> *Azhir*, 20 Nov. 1943.

declared his candidacy in Tabriz as a progressive (*Azadi-khah*) and received *Tudah* support, he gave a flattering description of 'the fifty-three':

I had been in prison eight years when the fifty-three were brought in. Although they were well read, they lacked our revolutionary experience. We put our knowledge at their disposal, and when they saw that we had not lost hope after years of incarceration they gained strength. Their courage should never be forgotten in the annals of Iranian history. Doctors, professors, and intellectuals—the jewels of the Iranian intelligentsia—became political warriors, organizing prison strikes, refusing to capitulate to interrogations, and bravely facing torture.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding this electoral alliance, signs of conflict between Pishavari and the *Tudah* appeared in June 1944. Pishavari, in a series of articles entitled 'Is There a Genuine Party in Iran?', came to the conclusion that all his contemporary political organizations lacked real substance.<sup>2</sup> In a discussion obviously aimed at the *Tudah*, he argued that the parties which had tried to build a class-based movement had all failed because there was no class consciousness in Iran as there was in industrial Europe: 'Many of our workers are not proletarians, but are apprentices, journeymen, and artisans; many of our capitalists are not true members of the bourgeoisie, but are small shopkeepers, small landowners, and small traders; and many of our farmers are not peasants, but are rural tenants.' He emphasized that if a genuine party was to come into existence in the future it would have to avoid class connotations and stress its 'national' (*milli*) identity.

Another sign of friction emerged when Riza Shah died in exile. The *Tudah* continued its attacks on the former ruler. *Azhir* carried a favorable obituary, and sent its condolences to the royal family. The *Tudah* leaders refrained from criticizing Pishavari in public, but in private they described him as 'reactionary'.<sup>3</sup>

Pishavari, however, did not exercise equal restraint. When Buzurg 'Alavi, the novelist among Arani's group, published his reminiscences in a book entitled *Panjah va Sah Nafar* (The Fifty-Three), an anonymous reviewer in *Azhir* took the occasion to direct a personal diatribe against the *Tudah* leaders:

Dr Arani, even though he was not a member of the Communist Party, was an enlightened Marxist. The same cannot be said of his followers. These men, having read some books, published a journal, and accidentally participated in a strike, had no real political experience. . . The author confesses that he was craving a cigarette when he was arrested. The reader may obtain the false impression that all political prisoners react in the same weak way. Although there were some among us old prisoners who showed signs of weakness, we were, on the whole, far superior to these fifty-three. However, I prefer to gloss over the short-comings of some of these prisoners. . . But I don't understand why the author mentions so frequently Dr Bahrami (one of the three co-chairmen). This man has shown he has no ability to lead, organize, or establish ties with the masses.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. Pishavari, 'My Life', *Azhir*, 6 Dec. 1943.

<sup>2</sup> J. Pishavari, 'Is There a Genuine Party in Iran?', *Azhir*, 13–22 June 1944.

<sup>3</sup> H. Arsanjani, in a speech in the *Majlis*, gives an account of this episode. Iranian Government, *Muzakirat-i Majlis-i Shura-yi Milli* (Debates of the Lower House of Parliament), 15th *Majlis*, 14th Meeting, 16 Sept. 1947.

<sup>4</sup> Anon., 'Concerning the Book *The Fifty-Three*', *Azhir*, 22–29 Oct. 1944.

These attacks ceased as soon as Pishavari tried to take his seat in the *Majlis* and his credentials were questioned by the conservatives. As long as he needed *Tudah* support, he refrained from further criticism. Once his credentials were rejected in July 1945, he returned to his former self. He informed some of his friends in Tehran that since he saw no future for the *Tudah* Party, it was time to start a new organization.<sup>1</sup> A few days later he left the capital for Azarbayjan.

In Tabriz, Pishavari laid the foundations of his new movement. He was helped by three fellow Azaris from the early Communist Party: 'Ali Shabistari, Dr Salamallah Javid, and Ja'far Kaviyan.<sup>2</sup> Shabistari had played a prominent role in the Khiabani revolt, had fled north, joined the exiled Communist Party, and had not returned to Iran until 1941. He assisted in the creation of the *Tudah* branch in Azarbayjan and was elected its provincial chairman. But in 1943 he suddenly resigned from the party, formed the Azarbayjan Society, and became editor of its Azari newspaper, *Azarbayjan*. Javid, born in the same district as Pishavari, went to school in Baku, joined the 'Adalat Committee, returned to Tabriz in time to participate in the short-lived Lahuti coup, and fled back to Baku. There he studied medicine, returning to Iran in 1929, where he was soon thrown in jail. His hobby was the study of Azari dialects. Kaviyan, a veteran of both the Khiabani and Lahuti revolts, had lived in Soviet Azarbayjan from 1920 until 1925. When he returned home in 1925, he was imprisoned and was not released until 1941. He, like Javid, had not joined the *Tudah* Party.

On 3 September 1945 Pishavari announced the formation of his new party, the *Firqah-i Dimokrat-i Azarbayjan*, intentionally adopting the same label as Khiabani's organization. The first proclamation declared that Azarbayjan had a right to have its own provincial councils and to use its own language in schools. Two days later, Shabistari's Society of Azarbayjan affiliated with the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, and his newspaper, *Azarbayjan*, became its official organ. On 7 September the local central committees of the *Tudah* and the C.C.U.T.U. voted to join the new party without even consulting their superiors in Tehran.<sup>3</sup> A member of the *Tudah* central committee has admitted that the local organization defected from the national party because it felt that the leadership in Tehran had failed to represent the people of Azarbayjan.<sup>4</sup> Khiabani's revolt had helped to destroy the old Democrat Party. His ghost had returned now to haunt the *Tudah* Party.

The *Firqah-i Dimokrat* spent the next four weeks publicizing its program and extending its branches in Azarbayjan. Its policy was to minimize class differences

<sup>1</sup> Bamshad, 'Pishavari's Disappointment with the Tudah Party', *Aras*, 1 Jan. 1947.

<sup>2</sup> Bibliographical information concerning the leaders of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* have been obtained from M. Mujtahidi, *Rajal-i Azarbayjan* (Politicians from Azarbayjan) (Tehran, Chapkhanah-i Jahan, 1948); Anon., 'Get to Know the Leaders of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*', *Khvandani-ha*, vol. VI (15 Dec. 1946), pp. 12-13; Anon., 'The Leaders of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*', *Rahbar*, 9 Oct. 1946; Anon., 'History of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*', *Rahbar*, 12-13 Sept. 1946; and miscellaneous newspaper articles.

<sup>3</sup> Society of Iranian Socialists, *op. cit.* p. 46; and Military Governor of Tehran, *Evolution of Communism in Iran from September 1941 until April 1957* (Tehran, Kayhan Press, 1959), p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Dr F. Kishavarz, *Aras*, 1 Jan. 1947.

and maximize the communal conflicts with Tehran: 'Our aim is to unite all the people of Azarbayjan. The class struggle will not appear until we have safely secured our national rights'; 'Industrialists and workers must put aside their differences and work together for national good of Azarbayjan.'<sup>1</sup>

In early October the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* convened its first party congress. The delegates, declaring that they had learned important lessons from Khiabani's defeat, voted to form a militia. A month later these armed volunteers began their almost bloodless takeover. By 21 November the rebels were in control of most of Azarbayjan and were able to call a national congress. The delegates drew up a declaration of autonomy which they presented to the government in Tehran. This declaration summed up their aspirations:<sup>2</sup>

- 1 The People of Azarbayjan have been endowed by history with distinct national, linguistic, cultural, and traditional characteristics. These characteristics entitle Azarbayjan to freedom and autonomy, as the Atlantic Charter has promised to all nations.
- 2 The People of Azarbayjan have no desire to separate themselves from Iran or to harm the territorial integrity of Iran, for they are aware of the close cultural, educational, and political ties which exist between themselves and the other provinces, and are proud of the great sacrifices they have made for the creation of modern Iran.
- 3 The People of Azarbayjan support, with all their might, democracy, which in Iran takes the form of a constitutional government.
- 4 The People of Azarbayjan, like other citizens of Iran, will participate in the central government by sending deputies to the *Majlis* and by contributing their taxes.
- 5 The People of Azarbayjan officially and openly declare that they have the right to form their own government, like other living nations, and to administer their internal and national affairs, observing the integrity of Iran.
- 6 The People of Azarbayjan, having made great sacrifices for freedom, are determined to base their autonomy on the firm foundation of democracy. They, therefore, call for a National Congress which will elect the Ministers of the Autonomous Government.
- 7 The People of Azarbayjan have a special attachment to their national and mother tongue. They realize that the imposition of an another language on them has hindered their historical progress. This Congress, therefore, instructs its Ministers to use the Azarbayjani language in schools and government offices as soon as possible.
- 8 This Congress, with its seven hundred delegates and 150,000 signatures of support, declares itself a Constituent Assembly and appoints a Committee to administer Azarbayjan and implement the above resolutions until the convening of a National *Majlis*.

The congress also elected a central committee of nine for the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*. Headed by Pishavari, Javid, and Shabistari, the committee included only three former members of the *Tudah* Party in Azarbayjan: Biriya, the Azari poet and the chairman of the local C.C.U.T.U.; Sadiq Padigan, a veteran of the Khiabani revolt and a specialist in ancient languages whose knowledge of Farsi was

<sup>1</sup> Anon., 'Unity is the Basis of Our Certain Victory', *Azarbayjan*, 17 Sept. 1945; and Anon., 'Workers and Industrialists', *Azarbayjan*, 5 Sept. 1954.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the declaration for autonomy was published in *Azarbayjan*, 25 Nov. 1945.

rudimentary; and Zin al-'Abadin Qiyami, also a veteran of the *Khiabani* movement and a senior civil servant. The other three had not participated in the *Tudah*: Muhammad Taqi Rafi'i, a local notable who had represented Tabriz in the *Majlis* from 1928 until 1941; *Khulam* Riza Ilahami, a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Interior; and 'Ali *Shams*, a wealthy industrialist from Tabriz.<sup>1</sup>

On 12 December the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, having successfully negotiated the evacuation of the last contingent of Iranian troops, assembled its national *Majlis* in the provincial capital. The deputies elected a cabinet of nine ministers for the autonomous government of Azarbayjan. *Pishavari* became premier. Javid, Kaviyan, Biriya, and Ilahami were chosen ministers of interior, defense, education, and finance respectively. None of the other four had been active in the *Tudah* Party.<sup>2</sup> Thus, of the nine ministers only Biriya was a member of the *Tudah* at the time of its local dissolution. And his membership was in doubt. The *Firqah-i Dimokrat* cannot be described as the *Tudah* in disguise.

The uprising in Azarbayjan had drastic repercussions in Tehran among the ruling elite and the *Tudah* and non-*Tudah* intelligentsia. Although these three groups reacted in different ways to the political program of the rebels, they showed a common aversion to the linguistic demands.

The premier of Iran wrote a lengthy communiqué to the American ambassador informing him that 'the people of Azarbayjan have never considered Turkish their national or permanent language but merely a tongue imposed on them by the aggressions of the Mongols'.<sup>3</sup> The semi-official government newspaper, *Ittila'at* (Information), declared that Turkish was not the natural language of Azarbayjan: 'It is a stigma of the national disgrace we suffered in the hands of the barbarians.'<sup>4</sup> In another article it asked the rhetorical question: 'Who would exchange the cultured literature of Firdawsi, Sa'adi, and Hafiz for the uncouth babble of the Mongol plunderers.'<sup>5</sup>

The non-*Tudah* intelligentsia were more sophisticated in their arguments, but no less adamant in their opposition to the linguistic demands. *Afshar*, coming to the defense of the articles which he had written twenty years earlier and which were now being attacked in *Azarbayjan*, reasoned that nationality was not based solely on language: 'The essence of Iranian nationality must be based in its history, race, and, above all, in the sentiments of its citizens.'<sup>6</sup> A Kasravi disciple warned that the program formulated by the rebels would encourage 'Assyrians,

<sup>1</sup> The government history of the Iranian communist movement described these men as 'illiterate' and 'uninformed'. Governor of Tehran *op. cit.* p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> The other four were: Y. Azima, Minister of Justice; Dr Mahtash, Minister of Agriculture; Dr Urangi, Minister of Health; and M. Kabiri, Minister of Post and Telegraph.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of the U.S. ambassador in Iran to the Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1969), 1945, vol. VIII, p. 503.

<sup>4</sup> Editorial, 'Azarbayjan is the Center of Iranian Patriotism', *Ittila'at*, 24 Sept. 1945.

<sup>5</sup> A. Iqbal, 'The Turkish Language in Azarbayjan', *Ittila'at*, 20 Nov. 1945.

<sup>6</sup> M. *Afshar*, 'A Reply', *Darya*, 28 Oct. 1945.

Armenians, Arabs, Kurds, Gilanis, Mazandarani, and Lurs to press ahead for their own claims'.<sup>1</sup> And Hassan Arsanjani, an independent Marxist, advised that the linguistic demands were 'unnecessary' and were causing too many 'complications'.<sup>2</sup>

The *Firqah-i Dimokrat* reacted sharply to these criticisms. *Azərbaycan* declared that it was high time Persian intellectuals realized that there was such a language as Azari.<sup>3</sup> And Pishavari, speaking over Tabriz radio, announced that his party's main principle was the right to use the mother language: 'Whatever concessions we make in other areas, we will never compromise on this fundamental.'<sup>4</sup>

The immediate reaction of the *Tudah* leaders to the formation of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* was similar to that of the non-Communist intellectuals. It was, however, kept behind closed doors. Khalil Maliki has revealed that an emergency session of the leadership was convened as soon as they heard that the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* had come into existence and that the local *Tudah* organization had joined it.<sup>5</sup> He felt that these events threatened the survival of the whole socialist movement in Iran. At the emergency meeting he presented a resolution overruling the decision of the local organization, and refusing to recognize the communal identity of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat-i Azərbaycan* by referring to it as simply the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*. Only one member of the central committee opposed the resolution, and his position was based solely on the argument that it was too early to pass judgement. However, before the resolution could be distributed the following day as the official policy of the party, the Soviet embassy intervened. It argued that the statement would harm the solidarity of the international socialist movement, so the declaration was reluctantly withdrawn and the *Tudah* sent its congratulations to the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*.

The *Tudah* had been forced to support the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, but it could not be forced to support it for communal reasons. Cautiously and subtly, it tried to justify its policy by playing up the reformist tendencies of the rebels and playing down their communal orientation. This task was made easier, ironically, by the government's suppression of the *Tudah* organ *Rahbar* in the crucial months of September, October, and November. By the time it was permitted to reappear, the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* had incorporated non-communal issues into its policy, claiming that its aim was to help social reform throughout Iran.

On 17 November *Rahbar* carried its first article on Azerbaijan.<sup>6</sup> It described the economic stagnation of the region and the reforming policies of the rebels, and argued that the crisis had been caused by the ruling class exploiting the masses. It supported the demand for provincial councils, but ignored the language problem entirely. During the next four months the editors avoided commenting

<sup>1</sup> Anon., *Sar Navasht-i Iran Chah Khvahad-Bud?* (What is the Future of Iran?) (Tehran, *Chapkhana-i Ardibahasht*, 1945), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Editorial, 'Long Live Azerbaijan', *Darya*, 2 Oct. 1945.

<sup>3</sup> *Azərbaycan*, 25 Sept. 1945.

<sup>4</sup> *Azərbaycan*, 5 Sept. 1946.

<sup>5</sup> Society of Iranian Socialists, *op. cit.* p. 46.

<sup>6</sup> A. Khamah, 'The Party and the Internal Situation', *Rahbar*, 27 Nov. 1945.

on the crisis and limited themselves to reprinting news reports, most of them from West European sources. The second article on Azarbayjan did not appear until the end of March 1946.<sup>1</sup> The author, Amir-Khizi, the only member of the central committee who had participated in the Khiabani revolt, argued that the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* was a progressive movement whose success would strengthen democratic forces throughout Iran. Again, the language problem was entirely ignored. A third article was published a month later.<sup>2</sup> The author, a junior member of 'the fifty-three', found the root cause of the uprising to be the economic and political pressures directed by the ruling class: 'These pressures are not aimed exclusively at the people of Azarbayjan, but at the whole nation (*millat*) of Iran.' For the first time, the linguistic problem was mentioned, but was briefly described as 'a secondary issue'.

The *Tudah* pursued a similar policy in the public debates in the *Majlis*. It did not associate itself with the linguistic grievances of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, nor did it condemn their actions. Instead, it blamed the government for the upheaval and advised a swift and peaceful settlement. Radmanish, one of the leading party deputies warned:<sup>3</sup>

Don't imagine that this crisis is limited only to Azarbayjan, for the southerners have even less food, clothing, and necessities of life than the northerners. . . The government must solve the problem quickly and peacefully. Otherwise, tomorrow, some other group elsewhere will form an organization, and will say: 'Yes sir, we are Arabs, and we want our Arabistan.' What will you reply?

The *Tudah* still was reluctant to openly criticize the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*. However the unofficial newspapers associated with the party did not exhibit the same inhibitions. *Shahbaz* (The Falcon), a daily managed by a party intellectual, and later to become the organ of the party, published an editorial entitled: 'The Farsi Language is the Best Means of Protecting Our National Unity':<sup>4</sup>

We realize that our brothers in Azarbayjan have a strong attachment to their local language, which has been unjustly maligned. But we hope this attachment is not so extreme that it will weaken Farsi, the national and traditional language of the state. We are certain that the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* has taken into account this important consideration, which touches us very closely. And we hope that it will pursue a policy which will not lead to the cultural breakdown of the country.

*Iran-i Ma* (Our Iran), another newspaper allied with the *Tudah* at the time, printed an editorial called 'The National Language of Azarbayjan is Farsi'.<sup>5</sup> The editor argued that he could not consider the 'local' language of Azarbayjan

<sup>1</sup> A. Amir-Khizi, 'The Role of Azarbayjan in the Creation of an Independent and Democratic Iran', *Rahbar*, 29 Mar. 1946.

<sup>2</sup> A. Khamah, 'Toward Solving the Azarbayjan Problem', *Rahbar*, 23 Apr. 1946.

<sup>3</sup> R. Radmanish, Debates of the Lower House of Parliament, *op. cit.* 14th *Majlis*, 174th Meeting, 25 Dec. 1946.

<sup>4</sup> Editorial, 'The Farsi Language is the Best Means of Protecting Our National Unity', *Shahbaz*, 20 Jan. 1946.

<sup>5</sup> Editorial, 'The National Language of Azarbayjan is Farsi', *Iran-i Ma*, 9 Dec. 1945.

to be the 'national' language of Azarbayjan, for Azarbayjan was a part of the Iranian 'nation'. He suggested that the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* could eliminate many misunderstandings if it replaced the slogan 'the nation of Azarbayjan', with the acceptable phrase 'the people of Azarbayjan'. In another editorial the same paper advised the rebels to be moderate in their cultural demands, for the sake of not alienating the left in Tehran: 'The head of the *Tudah* delegation in the *Majlis* is willing to discuss the proposal that the first three grades of school in Azarbayjan should be conducted in Azari, but I am sure he will never accept the demand that all classes should be conducted in the local language.'<sup>1</sup>

The language issue separated the *Tudah* from the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, but the gulf between them was hidden by a number of factors. First, both parties were closely identified with the Soviet Union, and neither was willing to embarrass its mutual ally by initiating a public polemic. Second, the Azari-speaking labor organizers from outside Azarbayjan who were leading the pro-*Tudah* unions used their influence within the party in favor of the rebels. Living outside their native province, they had no incentive to raise linguistic and regional issues, but once these demands were raised they could not resist taking a stand. The organ of the C.C.U.T.U., *Zafar* (Victory), printed letters from Azari workers in Gilan and Mazandaran pledging assistance to their brothers in Azarbayjan.<sup>2</sup> Its articles contrasted sharply with those of the *Tudah* organ by supporting the linguistic demands of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*: 'The people of Azarbayjan have spoken Turkish for nine hundred years. Who can deny that it is their mother tongue? The worst way to deal with the problem is to force one language on all the minorities, as the Tsars tried to do. The best way is to recognize the different languages, as the Swiss have done.'<sup>3</sup> Third, the rebels moderated their demands. By May 1946 they were willing to accept an agreement in which Azari would be the language of instruction only in primary schools.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, they implemented social reforms, covering their communal demands with radical terminology. They distributed state domains and some large estates among the peasantry; granted women the right to vote, for the first time in Iranian history; introduced a progressive income tax; built roads, clinics, schools, and a university. These reforms were attractive not only to the public in Azarbayjan, but also to the radicals in Tehran.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Editorial, 'Tehran Can and Must Retain Azarbayjan', *Iran-i Ma*, 20 Mar. 1946.

<sup>2</sup> *Zafar*, 10 May 1946. <sup>3</sup> K. Afsu, 'Linguistic Chauvinism', *Zafar*, 14 Dec. 1945.

<sup>4</sup> A. 'Amidi-Nuri, *Azarbayjan Dimokrat* (Democratic Azarbayjan) (Tehran, Inti-sharat-i Ruznamah-i Dad, 1946), pp. 80-1.

<sup>5</sup> For signs of their popularity in Azarbayjan see: *New York Times*, 14 Dec. 1946; P. Homayounpour, *L'Affaire d'Azerbaïjan* (Lausanne, Lausanne University Press, 1967), pp. 59, 79, 133, and 145. In Nov. 1945 the U.S. ambassador wrote to the Secretary of State: 'Our consul and the British consul in Tabriz agree movement would probably collapse if Russian support disappeared but also agree that there is fairly substantial popular sympathy of movement and feel population of Azerbaijan has real grievances against the central government.' U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1969), 1945, vol. VIII, p. 465.

These factors drew the *Tudah* to the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*. The party sponsored demonstrations calling for the establishment of provincial councils. The Armenian member of the central committee published an article in *Rahbar* summarizing Stalin's view of the nationality problem. And in June 1946 the *Tudah* formed a United Front with the small Iran Party, inviting others to join on the condition they recognized the C.C.U.T.U. as the only legitimate trade union organization in the country. Three months later delegates from the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* arrived in Tehran to negotiate with the government, and they took the opportunity to begin discussions with the United Front. At a public meeting, representatives of the *Tudah* and the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* stated their policies, and in doing so revealed the communal gulf that still existed between them. Radmanish, speaking for the *Tudah*, declared:<sup>1</sup>

There is now in Iran a militant labor movement unprecedented in our country's history. Its creation was not easy, for it is not a task that anyone can undertake. One must first gain the confidence of the working class, and those who try to appeal both to the employers and employees will inevitably fail. The C.C.U.T.U., as a result of its correct policies, heroic struggles, and many sacrifices, has won the confidence of all workers from the Araxes river in the north to the Persian Gulf in the south. The first duty of all patriots and progressives is to recognize the united organization of the Iranian working class, and to work for the forward march of the labor movement.

Javid, from Azarbayjan, without directly attacking the previous speaker, gave a radically different analysis of the situation:

The people of Azarbayjan have spent more time on action and less time on theory. Their leaders have fortunately realized that they must have internal unity among all classes, for their adversaries do not differentiate among workers, landowners, merchants, and peasants. When a town or a village is in ruin all suffer, including the wealthy merchant who is forced to send away his son to school. As a result of years of oppression, the people of Azarbayjan have correctly diagnosed their former disease of disunity, and have successfully built a national movement. Only when we have created a united front of progressive parties, only then can we discuss the need to have one worker's organization. . . All classes in Iran—landowners, merchants, workers, and intellectuals—must unite and protect their state. After achieving unity we can sit down and solve any class differences that may exist.

Behind the scenes the discussions were less restrained. Javid accused the *Tudah* Minister of Education of neglecting Azarbayjan. Khalil Maliki, who was at the time an official in that Ministry, retorted that he had difficulty recruiting teachers for Azarbayjan because even members of the *Tudah* had been hounded out of the province because of inability to conduct their classes in Azari.<sup>2</sup>

The delegates from Tabriz returned home without joining the United Front. It was not until November that they agreed to work with the *Tudah*. The *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, the *Tudah* and the Iran Party, together with two regional organizations—the Kurdish Democratic Party and the revived *Jangali* Party of Gilan—formed a coalition for the forthcoming parliamentary elections. In 1949, when the

<sup>1</sup> *Rahbar*, 12 Sept. 1946.

<sup>2</sup> Society of Iranian Socialists, *op. cit.* p. 50.

government outlawed the *Tudah*, it used this alliance as proof of its 'separatist' aspirations.

However, before the coalition could take effect the central government ordered the army into Azarbayjan to supervise the elections. The *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, left without Soviet protection and assistance, capitulated without fighting. The Iranian army entered Tabriz on 12 December 1946, exactly a year after the creation of the autonomous government of Azarbayjan and the revolt was over.

At the beginning of the uprising Pishavari had promised that he would duplicate K<sup>h</sup>iabani's success but not his final downfall. But the revolt followed the course of the earlier rebellion to its bitter end. History had repeated itself in the defeat of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*: first, in K<sup>h</sup>iabani's death, second, in the irony of Pishavari's flight. After insisting for a year that there were only two roads open before him—'to victory or to death'—he finally discovered himself on the road to exile.

#### THE PASSAGE TO UNITY 1946–60

The *Tudah* and the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* were not simply two sides of the same coin. On the contrary, they were separated from each other by contrasting social bases, conflicting interests, and, at times, clashing policies. The former was organized by Persian intellectuals who had come to Communism through the Marxism of Western Europe. The latter was formed by Azari patriots who had reached the same destination through the Leninism of the Bolshevik Party in the Caucasus. The first group, being Marxist, belonging to the dominant community, and residing in Tehran, tending to view society through the class struggle, disregarding the linguistic conflicts and underestimating the regional grievances of the provinces against the capital. The second group, having fought in the K<sup>h</sup>iabani movement and the *Jangali* revolt and having seen the ethnic programs of Tsarist Russia, was inclined to shun the class struggle in favor of communal conflicts. In short, the *Tudah* was a class party based on the national intelligentsia and the proletariat; the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* was a communal organization appealing exclusively to the people of Azarbayjan.

These differences divided the two parties for fourteen years after the collapse of the uprising.<sup>1</sup> The *Firqah-i Dimokrat* continued to focus on its sectarian grievances. The *Tudah* retained its Marxist orthodoxy, although at brief moments it championed communal grievances. It was not until the two pro-Soviet leaderships felt threatened by anti-Soviet Communists that they put aside their differences and united into one organization. In 1960, at a joint plenum of the two central committees, the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* voted to merge with the *Tudah*. Its chairman was taken into the new central committee. One of the former leaders of the *Tudah* who opposed this union resigned from the party. And at a joint

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the sudden collapse see S. Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966), pp. 117–22.

conference of the two organizations the delegates approved a party program that incorporated the basic principles of the two sides:<sup>1</sup>

The *Tudah* Party of Iran is the only party of the Iranian working class... Iran is a multi-national state. However, many factors help to bring together the many peoples living in Iran: their common history for many centuries; their common contribution to the creation of a rich culture; and their common struggle against imperialism. Since the *Tudah* Party desires the unity of all the peoples living in Iran, and believes that this unity can be secured only on the basis of equality and the right of nations to self-determination, it recognizes clearly the national, social, and cultural rights of all the nations living in Iran.

The *Tudah* had accepted the Leninism of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*, and the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* had accepted the Marxism of the *Tudah*.

A party official, five years later, briefly discussed this union.<sup>2</sup> He wrote that Riza Shah's cultural policies had suppressed the non-*Farsi* population; that his economic policies had exploited Azarbayjan even more than the other provinces; and that the late Pishavari had represented the aspirations of the people of Azarbayjan. He admitted that the *Tudah* had failed to pay adequate attention to the nationality problem in its early years, and he criticized the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* for underestimating the class struggle.

The voice of the party chairman was added to this criticism. In celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the uprising in Azarbayjan, he praised the general aspirations of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat* but criticized its actions on four accounts: its emphasis on the nationality problem at the expense of social problems; its reluctance to join the United Front; its flirtations with the government, and even with the Shah; and its contribution to the division of the Socialist movement in Iran.<sup>3</sup> For the first time, a *Tudah* leader had publicly and elaborately discussed the differences between his own party and the leadership of the *Firqah-i Dimokrat*. It was a sign that these differences, once seemingly irreconcilable, had now been accepted, if not resolved.

<sup>1</sup> *Tudah* Party, *Maramnamah-i Hizb* (Party Program) (Europe, Intisharat-i Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran), pp. 5 and 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Farvardin, *op. cit.* pp. 1-4.

<sup>3</sup> R. Radmanish, 'The December 12th Movement', *Dunya*, vol. 2 (Winter, 1965), pp. 9-18.